# 1 Best Practices in the Hypervisor

## 1.1 Handling unexpected conditions

### 1.1.1 Guidelines

Passing errors up the stack should be used when the caller is already expecting to handle errors, and the state when the error was discovered isn’t broken, or isn’t too hard to fix.

domain_crash() should be used when passing errors up the stack is too difficult, and/or when fixing up state of a guest is impractical, but where fixing up the state of Xen will allow Xen to continue running. This is particularly appropriate when the guest is exhibiting behavior well-behaved guests shouldn’t.

BUG_ON() should be used when you can’t pass errors up the stack, and either continuing or crashing the guest would likely cause an information leak or privilege escalation vulnerability.

ASSERT() IS NOT AN ERROR HANDLING MECHANISM. ASSERT is a way to move detection of a bug earlier in the programming cycle; it is a more-noticeable printk. It should only be added after one of the other three error-handling mechanisms has been evaluated for reliability and security.

### 1.1.2 Rationale

It’s frequently the case that code is written with the assumption that certain conditions can never happen. There are several possible actions programmers can take in these situations:

- Programmers can simply not handle those cases in any way, other than perhaps to write a comment documenting what the assumption is.
- Programmers can try to handle the case gracefully – fixing up in-progress state and returning an error to the user.
- Programmers can crash the guest.
- Programmers can use ASSERT(), which will cause the check to be executed in DEBUG builds, and cause the hypervisor to crash if it’s violated
- Programmers can use BUG_ON(), which will cause the check to be executed in both DEBUG and non-DEBUG builds, and cause the hypervisor to crash if it’s violated.

In selecting which response to use, we want to achieve several goals:

- To minimize risk of introducing security vulnerabilities, particularly as the code evolves over time
- To efficiently spend programmer time
- To detect violations of assumptions as early as possible
- To minimize the impact of bugs on production use cases

The guidelines above attempt to balance these:

- When the caller is expecting to handle errors, and there is no broken state at the time the unexpected condition is discovered, or when fixing the state is straightforward, then fixing up the state and returning an error is the most robust thing to do. However, if the caller isn’t expecting to handle errors, or if the state is difficult to fix, then returning an error may require extensive refactoring, which is not a good use of programmer time when they’re certain that this condition cannot occur.
- BUG_ON() will stop all hypervisor action immediately. In situations where continuing might allow an attacker to escalate privilege, a BUG_ON() can change a privilege escalation or information leak into a denial-of-service (an improvement). But in situations where continuing (say, returning an error) might be safe, then BUG_ON() can change a benign failure into denial-of-service (a degradation).
- domain_crash() is similar to BUG_ON(), but with a more limited effect: it stops that domain immediately. In situations where continuing might cause guest or hypervisor corruption, but destroying the guest allows the hypervisor to continue, this can change a more serious bug into a guest denial-of-service. But in situations where returning an error might be safe, then domain_crash() can change a benign failure into a guest denial-of-service.
- ASSERT() will stop the hypervisor during development, but allow hypervisor action to continue during production. In situations where continuing will at worst result in a denial-of-service, and at best may have little effect other than perhaps quirky behavior, using an ASSERT() will allow violation of assumptions to be detected as soon as possible, while not causing undue degradation in production hypervisors. However, in situations where continuing could cause privilege escalation or information leaks, using an ASSERT() can introduce security vulnerabilities.

Note however that domain_crash() has its own traps: callers far up the call stack may not realize that the domain is now dying as a result of an innocuous-looking operation, particularly if somewhere on the callstack between the initial function call and the failure, no error is returned. Using domain_crash() requires careful inspection and documentation of the code to make sure all callers at the stack handle a newly-dead domain gracefully.