# Netatalk Manual

- Introduction
- Installation
- Configuration
  - CNID Backends
  - Character Sets
  - Authentication
  - ACL Support
  - Directory Caching
  - Interoperability
  - Filesystem Change Events
  - Search
- AppleTalk
- Upgrading
- License
- Legal Notices

# Authentication

## AFP authentication basics

Apple chose a flexible model called “User Authentication Methods” (UAMs) for authentication between AFP clients and servers. An AFP client connecting to an AFP server first requests the list of UAMs that the server supports, then chooses the one with the strongest encryption that the client also supports.

Several UAMs have been developed by Apple over the years, and some by third-party developers.

## UAMs supported by Netatalk

Netatalk supports the following UAMs by default:

- “No User Authent” UAM (guest access without authentication)

- “Cleartxt Passwrd” UAM (no password encryption)

- “Randnum exchange”/“2-Way Randnum exchange” UAMs (very weak password encryption, separate password storage)

- “DHCAST128” UAM (a.k.a. DHX; weak password encryption)

- “DHX2” UAM (successor of DHCAST128 with stronger password encryption)

- “SRP” UAM (“Secure Remote Password”, strongest password encryption and resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks, separate verifier storage)

With Kerberos support enabled at compile time, Netatalk also supports:

- “Client Krb v2” UAM (Kerberos V, suitable for “Single Sign On” scenarios with macOS clients — see below)

You can configure which UAMs to activate by setting uam list in the Global section. afpd logs which UAMs it activates and reports any problems in either netatalk.log or syslog at startup. asip-status can also query the available UAMs of AFP servers.

Having a specific UAM available on the server does not automatically mean that a client can use it. Client-side support is also required. For older Macintosh clients running Classic Mac OS, DHCAST128 support has been available since AppleShare client 3.8.x.

On macOS, there are client-side techniques to make the AFP client more verbose, allowing you to observe the UAM negotiation process. See this hint.

## Which UAMs to activate?

The choice depends primarily on your needs and the clients you need to support. If your network consists exclusively of macOS (Mac OS X) clients, DHX2 provides strong encryption with PAM (or system password database) integration.

If you want stronger security and don’t mind the extra maintenance overhead of a separate verifier file, SRP is the best choice.

- Unless you specifically need guest access, do not enable “No User Authent” to prevent accidental unauthorized access. If you must enable guest access, enforce it on a per-volume basis using access controls.

  Note: “No User Authent” is required to use Apple II network boot services (a2boot) to boot an Apple //e over AFP.

- The “ClearTxt Passwrd” UAM is as bad as it sounds: passwords are sent unencrypted over the wire. Avoid it on both the server and client side.

  Note: If you want to provide Mac OS 8/9 clients with network boot services, you need uams_clrtxt.so since the AFP client integrated into the Mac’s firmware can only handle this basic form of authentication.

- “Randnum exchange”/“2-Way Randnum exchange” uses only 56-bit DES for encryption, so it should also be avoided. An additional disadvantage is that passwords are stored separately on the server: DES-encrypted and hex-encoded with a required key file.

  However, this is the strongest form of authentication available for Macintosh System Software 7.1 or earlier.

- “DHCAST128” (“DHX”) is a significant improvement over Randnum, but has weak encryption by today’s standards.

  This is the strongest form of authentication available for Mac OS 8/9 clients.

- “DHX2” is the best choice for most users, combining stronger encryption with the convenience of PAM integration.

- “SRP” is the strongest UAM with the strongest password encryption and resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks, but it requires administration of a separate file to store per-user salts and verifiers. If you don’t mind the extra maintenance overhead of this file, SRP is the best choice for security-conscious users.

- The Kerberos V (“Client Krb v2”) UAM enables true single sign-on scenarios using Kerberos tickets. The password is not sent over the network. Instead, the user’s password decrypts a service ticket for the AFP server. The service ticket contains an encryption key for the client and some encrypted data (which only the AFP server can decrypt). The encrypted portion of the service ticket is sent to the server and used to authenticate the user. Because of how afpd implements service principal detection, this authentication method is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.

For a more detailed overview of the technical implications of the different UAMs, see Apple’s File Server Security documentation.

## Password storage

Randnum and SRP do not use system passwords directly. They both rely on separate files managed with afppasswd:

- Randnum uses the legacy afppasswd file. It requires a key file alongside the Randnum password file (same path with a `.key` suffix). afppasswd -r -c creates this key file if it is missing and validates an existing one; password updates refuse to proceed unless the key file is present and valid. The Randnum UAM logs a startup warning when the key file is missing or invalid, but authentication and password changes still fail until it is fixed. Stored passwords are DES-encrypted using that key.

  The key file must contain exactly 16 hexadecimal characters, such as `0123456789ABCDEF`, with an optional trailing newline. Generate a fresh random key for each server instead of reusing this example value.

- SRP uses afppasswd.srp, which stores per-user salts and verifiers.

## Using different authentication backends

Some UAMs support different authentication backends, namely uams_clrtxt.so, uams_dhx.so, and uams_dhx2.so. They can use either classic UNIX passwords from /etc/passwd (/etc/shadow) or PAM if the system supports it. uams_clrtxt.so can be symlinked to either uams_passwd.so or uams_pam.so, uams_dhx.so to uams_dhx_passwd.so or uams_dhx_pam.so, and uams_dhx2.so to uams_dhx2_passwd.so or uams_dhx2_pam.so.

If Netatalk’s UAM folder (by default /etc/netatalk/uams/) looks like this, then you are using PAM; otherwise you are using classic UNIX passwords:

    uams_clrtxt.so -> uams_pam.so
    uams_dhx.so -> uams_dhx_pam.so
    uams_dhx2.so -> uams_dhx2_pam.so

The main advantage of PAM is that it integrates Netatalk into centralized authentication scenarios, such as LDAP, NIS, and similar systems. Keep in mind that the security of your users’ login credentials in such scenarios also depends on the encryption strength of the UAM in use.

## Netatalk UAM overview table

An overview of the officially supported UAMs on Macs.

UAM | No User Auth | Cleartxt Passwrd | RandNum Exchange | DHCAST128 | DHX2 | Kerberos V | SRP
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Password length | guest access | max 8 chars | max 8 chars | max 64 chars | max 255 chars | Kerberos tickets | max 255 chars
Client support | built-in into all Mac OS versions | built-in in all Mac OS versions except 10.0; deprecated in 10.7 and later | built-in into almost all Mac OS versions; deprecated in 10.7 and later | built-in since AppleShare client 3.8.4, available as a plug-in for 3.8.3; deprecated in 10.7 and later | built-in since Mac OS X 10.2 | built-in since Mac OS X 10.2 | built-in since Mac OS X 10.7

Encryption

Enables guest access without authentication between client and server.

Password will be sent in cleartext over the wire. Just as bad as it sounds, therefore avoid at all costs.

8-byte random numbers are sent over the wire, comparable with DES, 56 bits. Vulnerable to offline dictionary attack. Requires separately stored server-side passwords.

Password will be encrypted with 128 bit CAST, user will be authenticated against the server but not vice versa. Therefore weak against man-in-the-middle attacks.

Password will be encrypted with 128 bit CAST in CBC mode. User will be authenticated against the server but not vice versa. Therefore weak against man-in-the-middle attacks.

Password is not sent over the network. Due to the service principal detection method, this authentication method is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.

Password is never sent; SRP uses a verifier and mutual proofs (M1/M2) to authenticate both client and server, providing protection against man‑in‑the‑middle attacks.

Server support | uams_guest.so | uams_clrtxt.so | uams_randnum.so | uams_dhx.so | uams_dhx2.so | uams_gss.so | uams_srp.so
Password storage | None | Either system auth or PAM | Separate afppasswd file (DES-encrypted) | Either system auth or PAM | Either system auth or PAM | At the Kerberos Key Distribution Center | Separate afppasswd.srp verifier file

See the Apple Support knowledge base article on Connecting to legacy AFP services on how to enable deprecated legacy UAM in macOS. It is not recommended that you do this in production environments, however, since this may expose AFP user credentials in network traffic.

Note that a number of open-source and other third-party AFP clients exist. Refer to their documentation for a list of supported UAMs.

## Save and change passwords

Netatalk can be configured to allow clients to save or change their passwords on the server. The save password option in the Global section of afp.conf enables this feature, but the AFP client must also support and honor this flag.

To allow clients to change their passwords, set the set password option. This depends on the UAM in use and is not supported by all of them. Notably, the PAM-based UAMs support this feature, while those based on classic UNIX passwords do not.