ldns-dane(1)

NAME
ldns-dane - verify or create TLS authentication with DANE (RFC6698)

SYNOPSIS
ldns-dane [OPTIONS] verify name port
ldns-dane [OPTIONS] -t tlsafile verify

ldns-dane [OPTIONS] create name port
          [ Certificate-usage [ Selector [ Matching-type ] ] ]

ldns-dane -h
ldns-dane -v

DESCRIPTION

In the first form: A TLS connection to name:port is established. The TLSA resource record(s) for name are used to authenticate the connection.

In the second form: The TLSA record(s) are read from tlsafile and used to authenticate the TLS service they reference.

In the third form: A TLS connection to name:port is established and used to create the TLSA resource record(s) that would authenticate the connection. The parameters for TLSA rr creation are:

Certificate-usage:
    0 | PKIX-TA
        CA constraint
    1 | PKIX-EE
        Service certificate constraint
    2 | DANE-TA
        Trust anchor assertion
    3 | DANE-EE
        Domain-issued certificate (default)

Selector:
    0 | Cert
        Full certificate
    1 | SPKI
        SubjectPublicKeyInfo (default)

Matching-type:
    0 | Full
        No hash used
    1 | SHA2-256
        SHA-256 (default)
    2 | SHA2-512
        SHA-512

OPTIONS

-4  TLS connect IPv4 only

-6  TLS connect IPv6 only

-a address
    Don't try to resolve name, but connect to address instead.

    This option may be given more than once.

-b  print "name. TYPE52 \# size hexdata" form instead of TLSA presentation format.

-c certfile
    Do not TLS connect to name:port, but authenticate (or make TLSA records) for the certificate (chain) in certfile instead.

-d  Assume DNSSEC validity even when the TLSA records were acquired insecure or were bogus.

-f CAfile
    Use CAfile to validate.

-h  Print short usage help

-i  Interact after connecting.

-k keyfile
    Specify a file that contains a trusted DNSKEY or DS rr. Key(s) are used when chasing signatures (i.e. -S is given).

    This option may be given more than once.

    Alternatively, if -k is not specified, and a default trust anchor (/usr/share/dns/root.key) exists and contains a valid DNSKEY or DS record, it will be used as the trust anchor.

-n  Do not verify server name in certificate.

-o offset
    When creating a "Trust anchor assertion" TLSA resource record, select the offsetth certificate offset from the end of the validation chain. 0 means the last certificate, 1 the one but last, 2 the second but last, etc.

    When offset is -1 (the default), the last certificate is used (like with 0) that MUST be self-signed. This can help to make sure that the intended (self signed) trust anchor is actually present in the server certificate chain (which is a DANE requirement).

-p CApath
    Use certificates in the CApath directory to validate.

-s  When creating TLSA resource records with the "CA Constraint" and the "Service Certificate Constraint" certificate usage, do not validate and assume PKIX is valid.

    For "CA Constraint" this means that verification should end with a self-signed certificate.

-S  Chase signature(s) to a known key.

    Without this option, the local network is trusted to provide a DNSSEC resolver (i.e. AD bit is checked).

-t tlsafile
    Read TLSA record(s) from tlsafile. When name and port are also given, only TLSA records that match the name, port and transport are used. Otherwise the owner name of the TLSA record(s) will be used to determine name, port and transport.

-T  Return exit status 2 for PKIX validated connections without (secure) TLSA records(s)

-u  Use UDP transport instead of TCP.

-v  Show version and exit.

FILES

/usr/share/dns/root.key
    The file from which trusted keys are loaded for signature chasing, when no -k option is given.

SEE ALSO

unbound-anchor(8)

AUTHOR
Written by the ldns team as an example for ldns usage.

REPORTING BUGS
Report bugs to <dns-team@nlnetlabs.nl>.

COPYRIGHT
Copyright (C) 2012 NLnet Labs. This is free software. There is NO warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.