# System Administrators

This document covers configuring SASL for system administrators, specifically those administrators who are installing a server that uses the Cyrus SASL library. You may want to read about components which presents an overview of the Cyrus SASL distribution and describes how the components interact, as well as the installation guide

## What SASL is

SASL, the Simple Authentication and Security Layer, is a generic mechanism for protocols to accomplish authentication. Since protocols (such as SMTP or IMAP) use SASL, it is a natural place for code sharing between applications. Some notable applications that use the Cyrus SASL library include Sendmail, Cyrus imapd, and OpenLDAP.

Applications use the SASL library to tell them how to accomplish the SASL protocol exchange, and what the results were.

SASL is only a framework: specific SASL mechanisms govern the exact protocol exchange. If there are n protocols and m different ways of authenticating, SASL attempts to make it so only n plus m different specifications need be written instead of n times m different specifications. With the Cyrus SASL library, the mechanisms need only be written once, and they’ll work with all servers that use it.

### Authentication and authorization identifiers

An important concept to become familiar with is the difference between an “authorization identifier” and an “authentication identifier”.

userid (user id, authorization id)

  The userid is the identifier an application uses to check allowable options. On my Unix system, the user `bovik` (the account of Harry Q. Bovik) is allowed to write to `/home/bovik` and its subdirectories but not to `/etc`.

authid (authentication id)

  The authentication identifier is the identifier that is being checked. “bovik“‘s password might be “qqqq”, and the system will authenticate anyone who knows “qqqq” as “bovik”.

  However, it’s possible to authenticate as one user but act as another user. For instance, Harry might be away on vacation and assign one of his graduate students, Jane, to read his mail. He might then allow Jane to act as him merely by supplying her password and her id as authentication but requesting authorization as “bovik”. So Jane might log in with an authentication identifier of “jane” and an authorization id of “bovik” and her own (Jane’s) password.

Applications can set their own proxy policies; by default, the SASL library will only allow the same user to act for another (that is, userid must equal authid). See your application’s documentation for details about changing the default proxy/authorization policies.

### Realms

The Cyrus SASL library supports the concept of “realms”. A realm is an abstract set of users and certain mechanisms authenticate users in a certain realm.

In the simplest case, a single server on a single machine, the realm might be the fully-qualified domain name of the server. If the applications don’t specify a realm to SASL, most mechanisms will default to this.

If a site wishes to share passwords between multiple machines, it might choose it’s authentication realm as a domain name, such as “CMU.EDU”. On the other hand, in order to prevent the entire site’s security from being compromised when one machine is compromised, each server could have it’s own realm. Certain mechanisms force the user (client side) to manually configure what realm they’re in, making it harder for users to authenticate.

A single site might support multiple different realms. This can confuse applications that weren’t written in anticipation of this; make sure your application can support it before adding users from different realms into your databases.

To add users of different realms to sasldb, you can use the `-u` option to saslpasswd2. The SQL plugin has a way of integrating the realm name into the query string with the ‘%r’ macro.

The Kerberos mechanisms treat the SASL realm as the Kerberos realm. Thus, the realm for Kerberos mechanisms defaults to the default Kerberos realm on the server. They may support cross-realm authentication; check your application on how it deals with this.

Realms will be passed to saslauthd as part of the saslauthd protocol, however the way each saslauthd module deals with the situation is different (for example, the LDAP plugin allows you to use the realm to query the server, while the rimap and PAM plugins ignore it entirely).

Realms are represented in a username string by any text followinhg the ‘@’ sign. So, usernames like rjs3@ANDREW.CMU.EDU, is user ‘rjs3’ in the realm ‘ANDREW.CMU.EDU’. If no realm is provided, the server’s FQDN is assumed (likewise when specifying a realm for saslpasswd2).

## How SASL works

How SASL works is governed by what mechanism the client and server choose to use and the exact implementation of that mechanism. This section describes the way these mechanisms act in the Cyrus SASL implementation.

### The PLAIN mechanism, `sasl_checkpass()`, and plaintext passwords

The PLAIN mechanism is not a secure method of authentication by itself. It is intended for connections that are being encrypted by another level. (For example, the IMAP command “STARTTLS” creates an encrypted connection over which PLAIN might be used.) The PLAIN mechanism works by transmitting a userid, an authentication id, and a password to the server, and the server then determines whether that is an allowable triple.

The principal concern for system administrators is how the authentication identifier and password are verified. The Cyrus SASL library is flexible in this regard:

auxprop

  checks passwords agains the `userPassword` attribute supplied by an auxiliary property plugin. For example, SASL ships with a sasldb auxiliary property plugin, that can be used to authenticate against the passwords stored in `/etc/sasldb2`.

  Since other mechanisms also use this database for passwords, using this method will allow SASL to provide a uniform password database to a large number of mechanisms.

saslauthd

  contacts the `saslauthd` daemon to to check passwords using a variety of mechanisms. More information about the various invocations of saslauthd can be can be found in `saslauthd(8)`. Generally you want something like `saslauthd -a pam`. If plaintext authentications seem to be taking some time under load, increasing the value of the `-n` parameter can help.

  Saslauthd keeps its named socket in “/var/state/saslauthd” by default. This can be overridden by specifying an alternate value to –with-saslauthd=/foo/bar at compile time, or by passing the -m parameter to saslauthd (along with setting the saslauthd_path SASL option). Whatever directory this is, it must exist in order for saslauthd to function.

  Once you configure (and start) `saslauthd`, there is a `testsaslauthd` program that can be built with `make testsaslauthd` in the `saslauthd` subdirectory of the source. This can be used to check that that the `saslauthd` daemon is installed and running properly. An invocation like `testsaslauthd -u rjs3 -p 1234` with appropriate values for the username and password should do the trick.

  If you are using the PAM method to verify passwords with saslauthd, keep in mind that your PAM configuration will need to be configured for each service name that is using saslauthd for authentication. Common service names are `imap`, `sieve`, and `smtp`.

Courier-IMAP authdaemond

  contacts Courier-IMAP’s `authdaemond` daemon to check passwords. This daemon is simliar in functionality to `saslauthd`, and is shipped separately with the Courier mail server.

  Note: this feature is not compiled in the library by default, and is provided for sites with custom/special requirements only (because the internal authentication protocol its not documented anywhere so it could change at any time). We have tested against the authdaemond included with Courier-IMAP 2.2.1.

  To enable `authdaemond` support, pass `--with-authdaemon` to the configuration script, set pwcheck_method to `authdaemond'' and point authdaemond_path to ``authdaemond`’s unix socket. Optionally, you can specify –with-authdaemond=PATH to the configure script so that authdaemond_path points to a default, static, location.

pwcheck

  checks passwords with the use of a separate, helper daemon. This feature is for backwards-compatibility only. New installations should use saslauthd.

write your own

  Last, but not least, the most flexible method of authentication for PLAIN is to write your own. If you do so, any application that calls the `sasl_checkpass()` routine or uses PLAIN will invoke your code. The easiest place to modify the plaintext authentication routines is to modify the routine `_sasl_checkpass()` in the file `lib/server.c` to support a new method, and to add that method to `lib/checkpw.c`. Be sure to add a prototype in `lib/saslint.h`!

  However, the more flexible and preferred method of adding a routine is to create a new saslauthd mechanism.

The LOGIN mechanism (not to be confused with IMAP4’s LOGIN command) is an undocumented, unsupported mechanism. It’s included in the Cyrus SASL distribution for the sake of SMTP servers that might want to interoperate with old clients. Do not enable this mechanism unless you know you’re going to need it. When enabled, it verifies passwords the same way the PLAIN mechanism does.

### Shared secrets mechanisms

The Cyrus SASL library also supports some “shared secret” authentication methods: CRAM-MD5, DIGEST-MD5 and its successor SCRAM. These methods rely on the client and the server sharing a “secret”, usually a password. The server generates a challenge and the client a response proving that it knows the shared secret. This is much more secure than simply sending the secret over the wire proving that the client knows it.

There’s a downside: in order to verify such responses, the server must keep passwords or password equivalents in a database; if this database is compromised, it is the same as if all the passwords for the realm are compromised.

Put another way, you cannot use saslauthd with these methods. If you do not wish to advertise these methods for that reason (i.e. you are only using saslauthd for password verification), then either remove the non-plaintext plugins (those other than login and plain) from the plugin directory, or use the `mech_list` option to disable them.

For simplicity sake, the Cyrus SASL library stores plaintext passwords only in the `/etc/sasldb2` database. These passwords are then shared among all mechanisms which choose to use it. Depending on the exact database method used (gdbm, ndbm, or db) the file may have different suffixes or may even have two different files (`sasldb.dir` and `sasldb.pag`). It is also possible for a server to define it’s own way of storing authentication secrets. Currently, no application is known to do this.

The principle problem for a system administrator is to make sure that sasldb is properly protected. Only the servers that need to read it to verify passwords should be able to. If there are any normal shell users on the system, they must not be able to read it.

This point is important, so we will repeat it: sasldb stores the plaintext versions of all of its passwords. If it is compromised so are all of the passwords that it stores.

Managing password changes is outside the scope of the library. However, system administrators should probably make a way of letting user’s change their passwords available to users. The `saslpasswd2` utility is provided to change the secrets in sasldb. It does not affect PAM, `/etc/passwd`, or any other standard system library; it only affects secrets stored in sasldb.

Finally, system administrators should think if they want to enable “auto_transition”. If set, the library will automatically create secrets in sasldb when a user uses PLAIN to successfully authenticate. However, this means that the individual servers, such as imapd, need read/write access to sasldb, not just read access. By default, “auto_transition” is set to false; set it to true to enable. (There’s no point in enabling this option if “pwcheck_method” is “auxprop”, and the sasldb plugin is installed, since you’ll be transitioning from a plaintext store to a plaintext store)

### Kerberos mechanisms

The Cyrus SASL library also comes with two mechanisms that make use of Kerberos: KERBEROS_V4, which should be able to use any Kerberos v4 implementation, and GSSAPI (tested against MIT Kerberos 5, Heimdal Kerberos 5 and CyberSafe Kerberos 5). These mechanisms make use of the kerberos infrastructure and thus have no password database.

Applications that wish to use a kerberos mechanism will need access to a service key, stored either in a `srvtab` file (Kerberos 4) or a `keytab` file (Kerberos 5).

The Kerberos 4 `srvtab` file location is configurable; by default it is `/etc/srvtab`, but this is modifiable by the “srvtab” option. Different SASL applications can use different srvtab files.

A SASL application must be able to read its srvtab or keytab file.

You may want to consult the GSSAPI Tutorial.

### The OTP mechanism

The Cyrus SASL library also supports the One-Time-Password (OTP) mechanism. This mechanism is similar to CRAM-MD5, DIGEST-MD5, SCRAM and SRP in that is uses a shared secret and a challenge/response exchange. However, OTP is more secure than the other shared secret mechanisms in that the secret is used to generate a sequence of one-time (single use) passwords which prevents reply attacks, and that secret need not be stored on the system. These one-time passwords are stored in the `/etc/sasldb2` database.

#### OTP via OPIE

For sites with an existing OTP infrastructure using OPIE, Cyrus SASL can be configured to use OPIE v2.4 instead of using its own database and server-side routines.

OPIE should be configured with the `--disable-user-locking` option if the SASL server application will not be running as “root”.

OPIE uses its own “opiekeys” database for storing the data necessary for generating the server challenges. The location of the `opiekeys` file is configurable in SASL; by default it is `/etc/opiekeys`, but this is modifiable by the `opiekeys` option.

A SASL server application must be able to read and write the opiekeys file.

## Auxiliary Properties

SASLv2 introduces the concept of Auxilliary Properties. That is, the ability for information related to authentication and authorization to all be looked up at once from a directory during the authentication process. SASL Plugins internally take advantage of this to do password lookups in directories such as the SASLdb, LDAP or a SQL database. Applications can look up arbitrary properties through them.

Note that this means that if your password database is in a SASLdb, and you wish to use it for plaintext password lookups through the sasldb, you will need to set the sasl `pwcheck_method` to be `auxprop`.

## How to set configuration options

The Cyrus SASL library comes with a built-in configuration file reader. However, it is also possible for applications to redefine where the library gets it’s configuration options from.

### The default configuration file

By default, the Cyrus SASL library reads its options from `/usr/lib/sasl2/App.conf` (where “App” is the application defined name of the application). For instance, Sendmail reads its configuration from `/usr/lib/sasl2/Sendmail.conf` and the sample server application included with the library looks in `/usr/lib/sasl2/sample.conf`.

A standard Cyrus SASL configuration file looks like:

    srvtab: /var/app/srvtab
    pwcheck_method: saslauthd

### Application configuration

Applications can redefine how the SASL library looks for configuration information. Check your application’s documentation for specifics.

For instance, Cyrus imapd reads its sasl options from its own configuration file, `/etc/imapd.conf`, by prepending all SASL options with `sasl_`: the SASL option “pwcheck_method” is set by changing “sasl_pwcheck_method” in `/etc/imapd.conf`.

## Troubleshooting

Why doesn’t KERBEROS_V4 doesn’t appear as an available mechanism?

  Check that the `srvtab` file is readable by the user running as the daemon. For Cyrus imapd, it must be readable by the Cyrus user. By default, the library looks for the srvtab in `/etc/srvtab`, but it’s configurable using the `srvtab` option.

Why doesn’t OTP doesn’t appear as an available mechanism?

  If using OPIE, check that the `opiekeys` file is readable by the user running the daemon. For Cyrus imapd, it must be readable by the Cyrus user. By default, the library looks for the opiekeys in `/etc/opiekeys`, but it’s configurable using the `opiekeys` option.

Why don’t CRAM-MD5, DIGEST-MD5 and SCRAM work with my old sasldb?

  Because sasldb now stores plaintext passwords only, the old sasldb is incompatible.

I’m having performance problems on each authentication, there is a noticeable slowdown when sasl initializes, what can I do?

  libsasl reads from `/dev/random` as part of its initialization. `/dev/random` is a “secure” source of entropy, and will block your application until a sufficient amount of randomness has been collected to meet libsasl’s needs.

  To improve performance, you can change DEV_RANDOM in `config.h` to be `/dev/urandom` and recompile libsasl. `/dev/urandom` offers less secure random numbers but should return immediately. The included mechanisms, besides OTP and SRP, use random numbers only to generate nonces, so using `/dev/urandom` is safe if you aren’t using OTP or SRP.

I’ve converted the sasldb database to the new format. Why can’t anybody authenticate?

  sasldb is now a plugin module for the auxprop method. Make sure you changed the /usr/lib/sasl2/*.conf files to reflect `pwcheck_method: auxprop`

  …and if you’re using cyrus-imapd, /etc/imapd.conf must reflect: `sasl_pwcheck_method: auxprop`

Is LOGIN supported?

  The LOGIN mechanism is a non-standard, undocumented plaintext mechanism. It’s included in the SASL distribution purely for sites that need it to interoperate with old clients; we don’t support it. Don’t enable it unless you know you need it.

Is NTLM supported?

  The NTLM mechanism is a non-standard, undocumented mechanism developed by Microsoft. It’s included in the SASL distribution purely for sites that need it to interoperate with Microsoft clients (ie, Outlook) and/or servers (ie, Exchange); we don’t support it. Don’t enable it unless you know you need it.

How can I get a non-root application to check plaintext passwords?

  Use the “saslauthd” daemon and setting “pwcheck_method” to “saslauthd”.

I want to use Berkeley DB, but it’s installed in `/usr/local/BerkeleyDB.3.1` and `configure` can’t find it.

  Try setting “CPPFLAGS” and “LDFLAGS” environment variables before running `configure`, like so:

      env CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/BerkeleyDB.3.1/include" \
        LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/BerkeleyDB.3.1/lib -R/usr/local/BerkeleyDB.3.1/lib" \
        ./configure --with-dblib=berkeley

It’s not working and won’t tell me why! Help!

  Check syslog output (usually stored in `/var/log`) for more information. You might want to change your syslog configuration (usually `/etc/syslogd.conf`) to log “*.debug” to a file while debugging a problem.

  The developers make heavy use of `strace` or `truss` when debugging a problem that isn’t outputting any useful information.

Is there a mailing list to discuss the Cyrus SASL library?

  Check out our contribution page for ways to get in touch with us, including mailing lists and IRC.